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1. Abstract  
The lion’s share of the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” investment in infrastructure from the 
Chinese investors has gone to the energy and transportation sectors, and only a very small 
share to the information and communication technologies (ICT) sector. However, the ICT sector 
has attracted growing investment not only from the public sector but also from the private 
enterprises in China, and stronger interests from the stakeholders in the BRI-related countries. 
The existing Chinese literature shows that the current investment in ICTs as well as digital 
connectivity and digital economy has had some positive influence on the implementation of the 
Sustainable Development Goals in those recipient countries. It has helped to facilitate economic 
growth of the least developed countries and rural areas of middle-income countries, to promote 
development of small and medium-sized enterprises, to encourage digital transformation of 
traditional industries and green growth, to narrow down the digital gap, and to enhance digital 
inclusion. 
2. Introduction 
The One-Belt-One-Road initiative has enormous potential to contribute significantly to the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It has five pillars, and they focus on policy, 
connectivity, trade, financial integration and people, and these areas of focus are directly 
in line with all the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals. The initiative has a broad 
span across the Silk Belt from the continents of Asia to Europe and across to Africa, and 
this enables it to have significant global influence. 
Dr David Nabarro, Special Adviser on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General 
The global development landscape has changed rapidly in recent years. Traditional approaches 
to development have been increasingly questioned by governments, practitioners and academics 
alike, and coupled with the emergence of new actors, there exists a space to enquire whether 
development policy and practice may move “beyond aid”. The UN Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) both have a global reach on the current 
and future landscape for international development. But what is the relationship between them – 
in promise and in practice? Will the BRI fulfil its potential to contribute to the SDGs – and what 
needs to happen for it to do so? 
The increasing influence of China has generated significant debate and discussion. China is 
regarded by some in the West quite critically. There is a tendency to see all Chinese activity, 
even if purely by private agencies and companies, as an extension of the power of the Chinese 
state, especially after witnessing the present global controversy about the Huawei electrical 
giant. China is criticised for not working with “civil society” enough in the development process. In 
particular some say it cooperates too exclusively with BRI state authorities. This report aims to 
take seriously these concerns. The paper demonstrates the general receptivity experienced by 
the Chinese private firms with both BRI states and civil society. The overall impact of the Chinese 
private sector is positive and its relations with local conditions are interactive with SDGs. 
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3. Ambition and intent: Chinese theoretical policy goals 
Chinese investment in digital infrastructure, e-commerce, among 
others, and potential linkages with the SDGs 
China has always stressed that the development promised for the BRI would be for mutual 
benefit and built upon commonly agreed goals for collaboration. When Chinese President Xi 
Jinping visited Central Asia and Southeast Asia in September and October of 2013, he raised the 
initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road 
(hereinafter referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI). In March 2015, with State Council 
authorisation, the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, jointly issued a policy framework 
paper for BRI (Xinhua, 2015), entitled Vision and proposed actions outlined on jointly building 
Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. Investment in digital connectivity 
and ICTs was incorporated into this policy document. Afterwards, the front-line government 
ministries concerned and top Chinese leaders, in particular President Xi, proposed detailed 
design and action plans for the investment in digital infrastructure.1 
The framework document, Vision and proposed actions (Xinhua, 2015), argues that countries 
along the Belt and Road have their own resource advantages and their economies are mutually 
complementary and thus there is great potential and space for cooperation. It proposes five 
priority areas for cooperation: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, 
financial integration and people-to-people bonds. In other words, China has always seen 
development in terms of the actual impact upon populations, not upon bureaucratic structures, 
which it recognises have the potential for corruption. 
Facilities connectivity is a priority area for implementing the BRI Initiative. Besides transportation 
connectivity and energy connectivity, the framework document has also put great emphasis on 
digital connectivity. It recommends that BRI countries should jointly advance the construction of 
cross-border optical cables and other communications trunk line networks, improve international 
communications connectivity, and create an Information Silk Road. It further proposes to build 
bilateral cross-border optical cable networks at a quicker pace, to plan transcontinental 
submarine optical cable projects, to improve spatial (satellite) information passageways, and to 
expand information exchanges and cooperation. 
In November 2016, the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National 
Defense and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) jointly issued a 
guideline paper (Xinhua, 2016) to facilitate the construction of spatial information passageways 
and their utilisation. It would be a comprehensive system to provide integrated services between 
the internet and spatial information. This system is composed of key spatial facilities for 
communication, remote sensing and navigation, and aims to support network and facility 
connectivity on the ground. 
                                                   
1 There are a good number of Chinese language documents as well as some English literature for this topic. For 
the BRI ambition and intent in investing in digital connectivity and ICTs, please see Xinhua (2015, 2016, 2017, 
2018); for the potential linkages with the SDGs, please see Guterres (2017), Cao (2016), Xue and Weng (2018), 
Xiang (2017), Li (2017), Choi and Yi (2009), Czernich et al. (2009), and Chinese Academy of Sciences (2017). 
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At the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in Beijing in May 2017, President 
Xi put great emphasis not only on information facility connectivity but also on information sharing 
(Xinhua, 2017). He proposed to pursue innovation-driven development, to intensify cooperation 
in frontier technological areas such as digital economy, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and 
quantum computing, and to advance the development of big data, cloud computing and smart 
cities so as to turn them into a digital Silk Road of the 21st century. President Xi also proposed to 
seize opportunities presented by the new round of change in energy mix as well as the revolution 
in energy and information technologies to establish global energy interconnection for achieving 
green and low-carbon development. Moreover, he has promised to pursue the new vision of 
green development and a way of life and work that is green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable, 
and to work together to achieve the goals set by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
More recently, in President Xi Jinping’s keynote speech (Xinhua, 2018) to a national conference 
on information development in April 2018, he expanded the areas for cooperation among the BRI 
countries further to cyberspace security. His speech has called for those countries taking full 
advantage of BRI and strengthening cooperation in internet infrastructure, digital economy, and 
cyberspace security to build a digital Silk Road of the 21st century. 
Potential linkage between the digital Silk Road and the SDGs 
At the 2015 Hangzhou G20 Summit, the G20 members recognised the potential of the digital 
economy to facilitate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda (Cyberspace Administration of 
China, 2015). It is generally agreed that there could be synergies among BRI countries, in 
particular between the digital Silk Road and the SDGs. 
At the political level, as reviewed above, President Xi has strongly recommended that BRI 
initiatives should not only incorporate the new vision of development, i.e. green, low-carbon, 
circular and sustainable, as one of the most important objectives, but also take the momentum of 
the emerging industrial revolution on the basis of digital technology, as one of the major means 
for development. This Chinese project has received the highest endorsement from the United 
Nations itself. When addressing the opening of the Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation, Secretary-General António Guterres also stated that the BRI and the 2030 Agenda 
could and should align with each other: 
While the Belt and Road Initiative and the 2030 Agenda are different in their nature and 
scope, both have sustainable development as the overarching objective. Both strive to 
create opportunities, global public goods and win–win cooperation. And both aim to 
deepen “connectivity” across countries and regions: connectivity in infrastructure, trade, 
finance, policies and, perhaps most important of all, among peoples (Guterres, 2017). 
Academically, several Chinese scholars have also argued for the importance of strong links 
between the BRI and the 2030 Agenda. Cao (2016) argues that alignment between these two 
standards could be an external constraint on Chinese enterprises going abroad and could push 
them to practise higher-level social obligations in accordance with the new development vision 
attaching to SDGs. Xue and Weng (2018) show how incorporating individual BRI projects into a 
host country’s framework for SDG implementation could facilitate the implementation of BRI 
projects in local contexts. Both articles argue that as a result such a strong link could strengthen 
the positive impact of China abroad.  
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More specifically, several scholars argue for the possible contributions of digital connectivity to 
the SDG implementation of participating countries along the Belt and Road. Following Metcalfe’s 
law, which states the effect of a telecommunications network is proportional to the square of the 
number of connected users of the system, Xiang (2017) suggests that the Chinese approach to 
digital economy and digital Silk Road would provide more universal benefits for all participants in 
terms of its openness, and would help narrow down the digital gap among BRI countries while at 
the same time providing good value for money. Based on the national panel data of BRI 
countries from 1996 to 2014, Li (2017) finds that internet coverage could make positive 
contributions to per capita GDP. The effect would be that 10 more percentage points of coverage 
would increase GDP by 0.9 percentage points. Such findings are quite similar to those of Choi 
and Yi (2009) and Czernich et al. (2009) in different contexts. Li (2017) also suggests that digital 
infrastructure would be more acceptable than transportation infrastructure because of the lower 
costs, lower risks and higher benefits of the former. 
Besides the possible influence of a digital Silk Road on all the three dimensions of sustainable 
development, the Chinese case shows that spatial information passageways could provide 
supplementary information to monitor and evaluate the progress of participating countries along 
the Belt and Road on sustainable development. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (2017) 
published the Report on remote sensing monitoring of China sustainable development 2016, 
which could provide data on several indicators relevant to SDGs such as land use, air conditions, 
forest coverage, sea protection, grain growth and water reserves All of this goes to show that far 
from aiming to increase the potentiality for oppressive state power, Chinese assistance in the 
development of a digital Silk Road will inevitably lead to more open and just public 
administration. 
4. From theory to practice: BRI activities in practice to 
date2 
Introduction 
This section notes that until April 2017 the extent of investment in digital infrastructure had been 
relatively low. This is partially due to the lower cost of this type of investment and also because it 
is from this date onwards that a concrete international institutional framework for digital activity 
was set by the Chinese government. At the same time, it is essential to recognise that its primary 
role in the actual development of the digital economy has been made through the Chinese 
private sector. Unlike other aspects of Chinese infrastructure development in infrastructure, this 
does not seem to be an unloading of excess Chinese capacity, but instead the replication of 
Chinese private sector best practice from home to abroad, with such a positive reception as to 
encourage the Chinese private sector to continue much further.  
                                                   
2 We have reviewed some Chinese literature for this topic. For BRI activities in practice to date on digital 
connectivity and ICTs, please see Zhou and Fang (2018), Chu and Li (2018), Cyberspace Administration of 
China (2015), Wen (2017), Ren (2017); for the impacts on the SDGs, please see Cheng (2017), Cao (2016), Xue 
and Weng (2018), Xiang (2017), Fu (2018), Liu (2017), Han (2018), and Gong (2018).  
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Levels of investment until April 2017 
Until April 2017, according to Zhou and Fang (2018), ICTs have not been so important compared 
to other sectors in outward Chinese direct investment in the infrastructure field. In terms of 
project number, the top three most important sectors were transportation, construction and 
energy, which accounted for 29.3%, 22.6% and 20.0% of total projects respectively, while the 
ICT sector only accounted for 2.7%. In terms of capital investment, the ICT sector accounted for 
an even lower share of the total, roughly 0.1%. This research also finds that most of 
infrastructure investment has been concentrated in South Asia and Southeast Asia.  
There are two major reasons for the lower proportion of investment in digital infrastructure. First, 
a single project in the digital sector on average costs less than the investment in other sectors, 
as mentioned earlier. Second, the digital economy is itself an emerging sector in China. 
However, since the digital Silk Road has become a renewed impetus to the progress of BRI and 
a new consensus among participating countries along the Belt and Road route, much more 
investment could be expected for digital investment (Ren, 2017; Chu and Li, 2018). 
Stages in the development of the digital economy   
Government framework initiatives3 
By April 2017, the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology had signed a letter of 
intent with the International Telecommunication Union to strengthen cooperation in the ICT 
sector within the BRI framework. The Ministry had signed bilateral memoranda of understanding 
(MOUs) with the government departments of Cambodia, Iran, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan 
respectively. Also, it had signed agreements with the five member states of the East African 
Community, Ethiopia and the International Telecommunication Union to co-build the information 
highways in East Africa. In addition, it had made an action plan to strengthen a partnership for 
joint development of ICTs between China and ASEAN. 
Chinese private sector initiatives with foreign governments 
Besides various cooperative mechanisms launched by the Chinese government, there have 
been some other mechanisms initiated by the governments of other countries with Chinese 
enterprises. Alibaba, for example, signed MOUs with the Pakistan Trade Development Bureau in 
May 2017 to promote the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
Pakistan, and with the Thai government in April 2018 which would establish an intelligent data 
centre in the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) to help the digital transformation of SMEs located 
in the EEC to build a digital platform for tourism in Thailand, and to enhance capacity of local e-
commerce workers. Another example is the Inspur Group, which initiated the “B & R” Digital 
Economy Strategic Alliance in November 2017 together with Cisco, IBM, Diebold and Ericsson in 
partnership with the Export–Import Bank of China, China Development Bank, the China Export & 
Credit Insurance Corporation, and the China–Africa Development Fund. This was the first 
cooperative mechanism launched by enterprises, which would provide world-class data centres, 
as well as cloud services and solutions to smart cities and smart enterprises. 
                                                   
3  Wen (2017). 
6 
Acceleration of cross-border infrastructure and export of Chinese services on the 
initiative of the Chinese government in collaboration with Chinese technology companies 
By April 2017, China had established 34 cross-border optical cables and a good number of 
submarine optical cables to connect 12 countries. In addition, the Chinese government has been 
assisting three basic telecom enterprises to participate in the construction of a “China–ASEAN 
Information Harbor”, as well as “six vertical and six horizontal” key optical cables in Africa. Last 
but not least, China has launched a collaboration with Laos and Algeria on satellite 
communication, and has promoted collaboration with ASEAN on the BeiDou Navigation Satellite 
System. The obvious effect of this is to promote broadband network coverage and improve 
service capacity and quality. 
The Chinese government has urged three basic telecom enterprises to expand their international 
communication businesses. In 2016, China Mobile Communications Corporation, China Unicom 
and China Telecom invested about 800 million USD in overseas markets, and started their 
business operation in many countries and regions including Pakistan, Thailand, and Singapore. 
At the same time, many private enterprises have also forced the pace of cooperation in BRI 
countries. Huawei Corporation, for example, has built more than half of the wireless towers, 70% 
of the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) mobile broadband network, and more than 50,000km of optical 
cable networks in over 50 African countries. 
This has been an example of Chinese companies exporting services abroad for the promotion of 
digital transformation of public services such as medical services. In Urumqi (capital of Xinjiang 
autonomous region), for example, a cross-border remote platform for medical services has been 
established connecting big hospitals in Urumqi, China and neighbouring countries including 
Kyrgyzstan and Georgia with Chinese metropolitan cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and 
Shenzhen that have advanced medical services. 
A similar example of export of best Chinese practice has been to engage in the construction of 
smart cities. Both Huawei and Alibaba, for example, have engaged in the construction of Smart 
Dubai. The initiative was launched in 2014 with the aim of building the smartest city in the world. 
In addition, Alibaba Cloud Computing has been involved in the data analysis of the EZ-Link Card 
in Singapore and the digital transformation plan of Saudi Arabia.  
A final example of outstanding Chinese practice exported abroad is Alibaba’s scaling up internet 
finance abroad and encouraging e-commerce cooperation. After successful innovation in China, 
Alipay has taken some share of fin-tech markets through M&A in India, Singapore, Korea, 
Russia, and Thailand. Such a distribution of cross-border exchange and accounting systems has 
laid a very solid foundation for Alibaba cross-border e-commerce cooperation. Paytm was the 
largest mobile payment and commercial platform in India but one year after being taken over by 
Ant Financial, it became the fourth biggest electronic wallet globally. By the end of 2017, Paytm 
had 215 million users, of which nearly 200 million were new users following the cooperation with 
Ant Financial. Alibaba’s idea of the electronic world trade platform (eWTP) has been embraced 
by some countries such as Argentina (Chu and Li, 2018). In May 2017, for example, the 
President of Argentina stated that the Government had reached a strategic agreement with 
Alibaba regarding eWTP. 
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5. Actual impacts of Chinese ICTs on the SDGs  
To facilitate economic growth of the least developed countries and 
rural areas of middle-income countries 
From 2014 to 2015, the annual GDP growth rate was 8.7% in Myanmar, most of which could be 
attributed to the investment in ICTs (Cheng, 2017). The Thai government is very keen on 
developing its digital economy and has been aiming to attract Alibaba and Huawei to invest in the 
EEC. According to Rookie Network Technology Co., Ltd (Fu, 2018), the key Chinese network for 
smart logistics controlled by Alibaba, it has established a fast track for fresh agricultural products 
including Durio zibethinus Murr from Thailand to many major cities in China. Huawei established 
an open lab in Bangkok in June 2017, a collaborative and innovative platform for local customers 
and entrepreneurs. The total investment of the lab was 15 million USD. In this way Chinese 
companies are, at the request of a foreign government, facilitating a foreign country to increase 
its exports to China by integrating it into Chinese marketing mechanisms. 
To promote the development of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) 
Alibaba  
Cloud Computing for EZ-Link could provide timely and useful information about potential 
customers for more than 50,000 SMEs in Singapore. The first overseas pilot zone of Alibaba for 
its eWTP was established in Malaysia, and it had attracted over 2,600 SMEs to operate on this 
platform by the end of March 2018, which opened up access to the Chinese market and even the 
global market (Fu, 2018). Tmall Global, a platform for purchasing overseas goods, controlled by 
Alibaba, has helped several Spanish brand products such as 5J Ham to expand into the Chinese 
market through a small team and at very low cost. This is another key example of how 
cooperation of Chinese private companies in the digital economy is helping foreign countries and 
companies to integrate into the vast Chinese domestic market.  
To promote digital transformation of traditional industries and 
green growth 
In China, the digital transformation programme of Alibaba Cloud Computing for Hangzhou City 
has achieved some positive results (Han, 2018). For example, the digital transformation of a 
traffic project has increased the average speed of vehicles in the city by 11%, and the digital 
transformation of a manufacturing project has yielded one percentage point higher of good 
quality products than a normal manufacturing process.  
Going abroad, for example, Liugong Machinery, a leading company in the engineering machinery 
sector in China, has been quite successful in pushing through its internationalisation plan (Gong, 
2018). Informatisation or intelligentisation is one of the concrete strategies to translate their plan 
into overseas practices, including the use of intelligent equipment, intelligent manufacturing, and 
intelligent post-sale services.  
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Narrowing the digital gap and thereby narrowing inequalities in 
African and other societies  
Han (2018) estimates that levels of informatisation of participating countries along the Belt and 
Road route increased by 2.78% in 2016 compared to the previous year, while the average global 
growth rate was 2.1%. Arguably, the better performance of the Belt and Road countries was 
attributed to the rapid construction of ICT network infrastructures and technical cooperation 
between China and the participating countries. The Tanzania case demonstrates this: China 
Telecom has helped the country to complete the construction of a key optical fibre transmission 
network. As a result, the level of informatisation in Tanzania has been upgraded from “no internet 
application” to “world class” level, which has also promoted the development of local ICTs and 
internet industries. Thanks to this achievement, the local telephone rate has decreased by 60% 
and internet use fees have decreased by about 50%.  Tanzania has become one of the most 
important communication hubs in East Africa. 
To enhance digital inclusion and encourage thereby the 
democratisation of and participation in public administration 
Huawei established an overseas training centre in 2012 for global talents. By the end of March 
2018, more than 40,000 technicians and experts had participated in the “future seed” programme 
at the centre. This has expanded the reputation and influence of some beneficiary countries such 
as Malaysia in the ICT field (Fu, 2018).  
According to Xu (2017) from CRI Online, the Inspur Group has helped the informatisation of the 
taxation administration of Zimbabwe. The engineering team from the Inspur Group stayed with 
their counterparts in Zimbabwe over the past four years and provided hands-on tutorials to the 
local technicians and engineers. Moreover, it did not charge the customers on a daily or even 
hourly rate basis. The success of the Inspur Group’s work in Zimbabwe has attracted other 
taxation bureaus in more than 10 African countries to learn these Chinese best practices. In 
response, the Inspur Group has organised more than 500 overseas events about cloud 
computing and big data, and has trained over 10,000 informatisation professionals for Egypt, 
South Africa, and Vietnam. 
6. Policy implications for traditional donors in partnering 
with China on BRI investment in infrastructure 
As already mentioned, in May 2017, Secretary-General António Guterres encouraged the 
participants at the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation that there could be and 
should be a strong linkage between BRI and the SDGs in a rapidly changing world. He argued: 
Our world is multipolar. But that by itself is no guarantee of prosperity and peace. A 
multipolar world needs multilateral cooperation to face common threats and seize shared 
opportunities.   
The Belt and Road Initiative has clear echoes of the ancient Silk Road. Today, we must 
take that spirit to new heights, for the benefit of all.   
As a Chinese saying goes, “building the road is the first step towards prosperity”. The 
United Nations system stands ready to travel this road with you in order to achieve the 
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Sustainable Development Goals and to fulfil our promise to leave no one behind 
(Guterres, 2017). 
This report argues for some positive links between the digital Silk Road and the SDGs, but much 
more needs to be done to keep the promise to leave no one behind. 
In September 2018, the European Commission issued a report entitled Connecting Europe and 
Asia: Building blocks for an EU Strategy (EEAS, 2018). While supporting the growing 
connectivity between Europe and Asia, the report attempts to establish consistent and aligned 
rules, standards, and practices to promote market access and the movement of goods, services, 
capital and people across borders. On one hand, the report provides an encouraging message 
because it argues for connectivity and cooperation. It could also mean more investment from the 
European side for the infrastructure financing required across the continent, and for the SDG 
financing globally. On the other hand, however, it is a slight cause for concern that the European 
approach to expanding connectivity may be different from that of the Chinese. The report 
maintains universal rules and standards as well as best practices, but the Chinese approach to 
BRI prefers to employ practical standards and most-fit practices. However, the Chinese think 
both sides could work together to increase overlapping areas for cooperation, and to maintain 
some marginal differences for comparison.  
This means, as always, controversy about China’s commitment to a so-called rules-based 
international order and to the development of democracy, which are seen as attached, in the 
West, to the development of civil society. It has to be appreciated that these are hugely 
ideological concepts which offer little possibility of clear resolution through empirical field 
research. They are speculative and rest upon anxieties which are themselves political 
speculations. As we see in this report, there is no evidence that the Chinese companies are 
actually reinforcing the capabilities of the state rather than other stakeholders. For instance, the 
use of night-time satellite images through the construction of road, energy, and digital capacities 
and networks in Africa and elsewhere, provides a timely injection of confidence that China’s 
development cooperation priorities and methods are having an impact on poverty reduction and 
inequality (Bluhm et al., 2018).  
China’s large private ICT firms are driving China’s digital revolution at home and internationally, 
including Africa. Huawei has located in Africa and put in place a large proportion of Africa’s 
backbone digital infrastructure in close association with both African governments and private 
telecom operators (IDE-JETRO, 2009). It also locates extensive R&D centres in Africa and its 
extensive training programmes for engineering staff.  
Of course there is a danger that China’s non-interference principle is being exploited by 
individual African actors to undermine the integrity of their countries, particularly in financing 
infrastructure. However, China has recognised in the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) action plan that it needs to have transparency and mutual responsibility in complex 
development operations. China’s policy banks are now the largest source of official development 
finance, intermediated from China’s bond markets as well as public funds and they have to have 
regard to debt exposure and reputational risk (Gu & Kitano, 2018). So it is not surprising that 
Chinese banks work closely with the World Bank as part of the Investing in Africa Forum, and the 
first joint publication (with China Development Bank) was Leapfrogging: The key to Africa’s 
development (Blimpo et al., 2017). Indeed, the work of the Global Infrastructure Connectivity 
Alliance (GICA) connects China and the World Bank. There is in all of this evidence a common 
interest in the hostility to corruption and arbitrariness as principal barriers to human development.  
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7. Lessons for the future4 
Lessons for achieving complex development goals 
The picture is not completely clear. As has been seen, Chinese private companies offering digital 
technology have been well received in Africa and Southeast Asia. The companies have 
encouraged digital literacy and inevitably more democracy with – what the Chinese would regard 
as – “the danger” of an “Orange Revolution”. In addition, this new knowledge about Chinese 
digital technology increases the possibility of access to Chinese markets.  
Firstly, Chu and Li (2018) argue that participating countries have made very strong demands for 
Chinese digital investment, especially after seeing how this has led to the substantial 
improvement of transportation and energy facilities. As reviewed above, a digital Thailand is a 
good example. In fact, as Fu (2018) points out, almost all countries in Southeast Asia have 
welcomed Chinese digital products, a mobile “payment and sharing” economy as new driving 
forces for bilateral cooperation.  
Secondly, the Chinese digital products and services are more relevant for the socioeconomic and 
political contexts of developing countries. For example, the Western e-commerce services are 
usually not suitable for a social context with rather low credit, but Alipay could address this 
problem. For another example, the Chinese digital enterprises could win more trust politically 
than their competitors from the West because the former are more likely to respect local 
characteristics, laws and religious cultures than the latter. The development of the digital 
economy has facilitated the openness of the ICT and internet fields in developing countries.  
Thirdly, there is quite a lot of synergy between the government and state-owned enterprises as 
well as private enterprises, and between the ICT sector and traditional industries (Cheng, 2017). 
While a single investor may have a very low return, the overall return of all Chinese investors 
working together may be quite reasonable.  
Fourthly, the Chinese market is huge and rapidly growing, which could drive overseas 
development. As pointed out already, digital literacy by China’s neighbours in the BRI 
encourages the possibility of exports to the Chinese domestic market.  
Fifthly, there are very complicated issues for the Chinese private digital investors arising 
precisely out of the unstable political situations in BRI countries. These countries are not 
attractive for large Western multinational companies because of the factor of political risk. At the 
same time, the Chinese companies are traditionally only used to dealing with governments and 
economic organisations, not with the media or non-governmental organisations. 
So there are common challenges of governance, political, financial, market and operational risks. 
The distinctive fact, however, is that this situation attracts rather than repels Chinese ICT 
investors, as it does to other Chinese investors. Many Chinese investors are risk-prone and they 
believe that higher risks could bring bigger opportunities and higher return (Gu et al., 2015, 
2016). As Zhang (2017) argues, the multinational companies are not willing to invest in countries 
                                                   
4 There is not much literature for this topic. For the lessons learned, see Chu and Li (2018), Cheng (2017), and 
Zhang (2017); for policy implications for the BRI, see Zhang (2017). 
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with higher risks, so there is little competition in such countries. So Chinese companies will face 
the challenges of the media and civil society and it is hard to see how this will have a negative 
effect on the political and social development of these BRI countries. Of course, more evidence-
based research is needed to capture the changing dynamics of this complicated relationship.  
While widely portrayed as another ‘win–win’ of China–Africa collaboration, questions have been 
raised as to the implications of China’s deepening involvement. The recent assessment by Iginio 
Gagliardone (2018) explored the question of whether China is imposing its information society 
model on the continent. Gagliardone’s evaluation was that, while Chinese involvement was 
contributing some positive gains for Africa, such involvement was usually set by the framework 
dictated by host states and directly or indirectly gave succour to them whether they be 
authoritarian or democratic in character. Nevertheless, this important caveat notwithstanding, at 
the core of this issue remains Africa’s need and Africa’s potential. 
In the foreseeable future, when the Chinese enterprises have changed from being a follower into 
a leader or even a regulator in an industry, the biggest challenge for Chinese investors would be 
the capacity of adaptation to the new roles. By then, the Chinese enterprises would have to be 
more forward looking and need to take more responsibility (Gong, 2018). In this respect, there is 
no evidence so far that they are under any all-embracing surveillance eye from the Chinese 
state, which is not directly involved after it has set up the multilateral and bilateral frameworks 
mentioned at the beginning of this report.  
 Indeed, on the contrary, the dynamic and attraction of BRI investment comes from local 
demand, trust and collaboration from stakeholders (Renwick et al., 2018). Comparatively, 
support for investment in the digital Silk Road is proving easier to get from local communities in 
participating countries. This is because the Chinese business solutions and practices are more 
appropriate for developing country contexts. Still, although Chinese solutions and technologies 
may not be the most advanced, they meet the needs of developing countries (Zhang, 2017). The 
Chinese practice of capacity building is very important to establish and consolidate cooperation 
with counterparts in participating countries. All the major Chinese actors in the ICT sector have 
put great emphasis on training, symposiums, and capacity promotion, which is a very good 
means of improving understanding, trust and effectiveness of South–South cooperation. 
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